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Abstract—The reliable and resilient operation of the smart 
grid necessitates a clear understanding of the intra-and-inter 
dependencies of its power and communication systems. This 
understanding can only be achieved by accurately depicting the 
interactions between the different components of these two 
systems. This paper presents a model, called modified 
implicative interdependency model (MIIM), for capturing these 
interactions. Data obtained from a power utility in the U.S. 
Southwest is used to ensure the validity of the model. The 
performance of the model for a specific power system 
application namely, state estimation, is demonstrated using the 
IEEE 118-bus system. The results indicate that the proposed 
model is more accurate than its predecessor, the implicative 
interdependency model (IIM) [1], in predicting the system state 
in case of failures in the power and/or communication systems. 
Keywords—Inter-dependency relations (IDRs); Phasor 
measurement unit (PMU); Smart grid; State estimation; 
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Maintaining a sustainable lifestyle is contingent upon an 
uninterrupted supply of electricity. Modern power utilities try 
to ensure the continuity of this supply by operating an intricate 
network that consists of intra-and-inter-dependent power and 
communication system entities. For example, the power 
network measurements of the smart grid obtained by its 
sensors must be transferred to the control center by the 
communication entities. At the same time, the communication 
network entities themselves need power from the smart grid 
for their continued functionality. This interdependency has 
become critical in a smart grid environment where the failure 
of an entity in one network can lead to failures of the entities 
of the other network. Thus, it is essential to understand the 
interdependencies between the two types of networks for 
predicting the effect of failure of one or more entities on the 
overall system state. An inaccurate prediction may impact the 
decision making of an operator which can then lead to a less 
efficient operation of the grid. 
Models that have been proposed previously to describe the 
intra-and-inter dependencies of critical infrastructures (such 
as [2],[3]) often lack physical realism as they are too simple to 
correctly portray the complex structure of the interdependent 
networks [4]. A specific drawback pertaining to the electrical 
infrastructure is the lack of clarity in the description of its 
communication network design. For example, in [5] a design 
of the joint network was given for the IEEE 14-bus system. 
However, the details of the information and 
communication technology (ICT) network were missing. The 
implicative interdependency model (IIM) [1] was successful 
in representing the complex interdependencies of a joint 
network using simple yet accurate Boolean logic-based Inter-
Dependency Relations (IDRs). However, it also failed to 
accurately model the communication network entities as it 
lacked knowledge of the communication network design. 
With the help of a power utility in the U.S. Southwest, this 
paper presents a realistic design of the structure and operation 
of the power-and-communication network of a typical smart 
grid.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II of 
this paper explains our design principles by superimposing a 
synthetic yet realistic communication network on to a power 
network.  Section III summarizes the differences between IIM 
and the proposed modified IIM (MIIM) using the concept of 
Inter-Dependency Relations (IDRs). A case study using the 
IEEE 14-bus is presented in Section IV to explain how the two 
models perform when a failure occurs in the system. Section 
V demonstrates the performance of IIM and MIIM on state 
estimation using the IEEE 118-bus system. Section VI 
concludes the paper and provides the scope for future work. 
II. DESIGNING OF A REALISTIC JOINT NETWORK 
In this paper, the smart grid is viewed as a multilayer 
network, where entities in power layer (layer 1) are called 𝑃 
type entities, 𝑃 = {𝑃1, 𝑃2, …𝑃𝑚}, entities in communication 
layer (layer 2) are called 𝐶 type entities, 𝐶 = {𝐶1, 𝐶2, … 𝐶𝑛}, 
and entities which belong to both the layers (layer 3) are called 
𝐶𝑃 type entities, 𝐶𝑃 = {𝐶𝑃1, 𝐶𝑃2, … 𝐶𝑃𝑜}. Fig. 1. classifies the 
joint network entities into these three categories. The figure 
also provides subdivisions of each of the three types of entities 
and the nomenclature assigned to them. 
In Fig. 1, the 𝑃 type entities are subdivided into buses, 
transmission lines/transformers, and battery backup. The 𝐶 
type entities are subclassified as substation entities (Type 1), 
synchronous optical networking (SONET)-ring entities (Type 
2), or dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM)-ring 
entities (Type 3). Subdivisions of each of the three types of 𝐶 
type entities are also shown in Fig. 1. The 𝐶𝑃 type entities 
consist of 𝐿 type entities (power supply channels to different 
𝐶 type entities), 𝑅 type entities (corresponding to remote  
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 Fig. 1. Nomenclature for every entity of the joint network 
 
terminal units (RTUs)), or 𝑈 type entities (corresponding to 
phasor measurement units (PMUs)). The design principles of 
the joint network are explained below in more details. 
A. Grouping buses into substations 
The buses of the power network are grouped into 
substations based on the logic given in [6]. The substation 
specific communication entities are Type 1 entities of Fig. 1. 
This step is further subdivided into the following sub-steps: 
1) Placing substation servers and gateways: The 
substation server (C1,1,Y,Z) is the main computing device of a 
substation. The supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) system inputs from RTUs and the synchrophasor 
system inputs from PMUs, reach the substation server via the 
gateway (C1,2,Y,Z). The substation servers of the control 
centers use SCADA/PMU data to perform state estimation. 
Substation servers of other substations compress and encrypt 
SCADA/PMU  data to forward them to the substation 
gateway. The gateway then sends the SCADA and PMU data 
to the control centers through the low bandwidth optical 
channels using SONET over Ethernet (SONEToE) [7] and 
high bandwidth optical channels using Ethernet over DWDM 
(EoDWDM) [8], respectively. Hence, the gateway connects 
the substation server to the rest of the communication 
network outside the substation and also to the PMUs and 
RTUs within the substation. Any data coming to and going 
from the substation server must pass through the gateway. 
The gateway also has a firewall that protects the server from 
cyber-attacks. The server is connected to the gateway via 
LAN connection (C1,3,Y,Z).  
2) Supplying power to the Type 1 ICT entities: The 
substation server and gateway receive power from the buses 
inside the substation. In order to avoid power outage within 
the substation, a battery backup (PBattX) is also present in 
every substation. The battery supplies power to the Type 1 
ICT entities when the buses in the substation do not have 
power. 
3) Placing two geographically diverse fiber optic cables 
from each substation: There are two types of fiber optic 
channels going out from the gateway of each substation. One 
is the low bandwidth cable (𝐶1,4,𝑌,𝑍) that uses SONEToE 
technology and the other is the high bandwidth cable 
(𝐶1,5,𝑌,𝑍) which uses EoDWDM technology. In order to 
observe the performance of the synthetic network under 
different scenarios, two different cases are considered in this 
paper with respect to data transfer via the optical fiber cables. 
In Case 1, the SONEToE channels are responsible for 
carrying RTU data to the nearest SONET-add-drop-
multiplexer (SADM) of  the SONET-ring (elaborated in Step 
4 of this section) while the high bandwidth EoDWDM 
channel can only carry PMU data to the nearest optical-add-
drop-multiplexer (OADM) of the DWDM-ring (elaborated in 
Step 5 of this section). In Case 2, under normal conditions, 
the low bandwidth SONEToE cable is responsible for 
carrying the RTU data to the nearest SADM of  the SONET-
ring while the high bandwidth channel is responsible for 
carrying the faster PMU data to the OADM of the DWDM-
ring. However, in case of failure of the low bandwidth 
channel, in Case 2 (unlike Case 1), the EoDWDM channel 
can transmit SCADA inputs from the gateways to the 
SADMs. For fault tolerance, the control center gateways are 
connected to every SADM in the SONET-ring via multiple 
low bandwidth channels and also to every OADM in the 
DWDM-ring via multiple high bandwidth channels. As an 
illustration, Fig. 2 shows the substation division of the IEEE 
14-bus system along with the substation servers and 
gateways. The (𝐶1,4,𝑌,𝑍) and (𝐶1,5,𝑌,𝑍) cables are shown in 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively. 
4) Placing RTUs and  PMUs: Every substation has RTUs 
(𝑅𝑖). However, due to budget constraints, PMUs (𝑈𝑖) are 
placed in only some of the substations using the methodology 
proposed in [9]. 𝑅𝑖 and 𝑈𝑖 measure SCADA system input data 
and synchrophasor system input data from the buses inside 
the substation and send them to the substation gateway via 
communication channels (𝐶1,6,𝑌,𝑍) and (𝐶1,7,𝑌,𝑍), 
respectively. 
B. Step 2: Finding shortest distance between all pairs of 
substations and selection of control centers 
In this step, the distance between a connected pair of 
substations is calculated first based on the length of the 
transmission line connecting them. The distance between all 
pairs of substations is calculated next using the Floyd 
Warshall’s all-pair shortest path algorithm [10]. Finally, two 
of the substations that are centrally located in the network and 
have large number of outgoing connections are selected as the 
primary and back-up control centers, respectively.  For the 
IEEE 14-bus system, substation 2 is selected as the primary 
control center and substation 1 is selected as the secondary or 
backup control center (see Fig. 2). Note that this step is needed 
for the realistic placement of the SONET and DWDM-Rings 
in a synthetic system, as elaborated in the subsequent steps. 
This step can be skipped if the locations of the SADMs, 
OADMs, and control centers are known in advance. 
C. Step 3: Placement of SADMs and formation of SONET-
Ring 
SONEToE is a popular communication technology in 
which the SONET frames are directly carried on the Ethernet 
link layer. In this paper, SONEToE technology [7] is used for 
transmitting RTU data from the substations to the control 
centers. SADMs are located in close proximity to the 
generating substations and the control centers as they are the 
most important substations of the system. Other substations 
transmit their SCADA data to the nearest SADM using the 
low bandwidth Ethernet channels. For fault tolerance all such 
SADMs are connected to each other via a ring structure, 
termed SONET-Ring. The link between two SADMs is bi-
directional; therefore, even if a single link or node in the ring 
fails, the ring as a whole continues to function normally. In 
normal conditions, data from every SADM is sent to the 
control centers directly. However, if a link between a control 
center and an SADM fails, data from that SADM is forwarded 
to the next SADM in the ring which in turn forwards the data 
to the control centers.  
Fig. 2. Substation entities and substation division of IEEE 14-bus system 
In case of the IEEE 14-bus system, SADMs are placed 
near S2 (main control center), S1 (back up control center) and 
S3, S4, S5, and S10 (generating substations). Therefore, a total 
of six SADMs are placed in this system (see Fig. 3). Gateways 
of all other substations are connected to the nearest SADM in 
the network. Each substation is thus connected to an SADM, 
except, the control centers which are connected to all the 
SADMs in the ring. Fig. 3 shows the SONET-Ring structure 
of the IEEE 14-bus joint network. The control centers are 
placed in the center of the ring to show the star-ring topology 
of the network. 
Fig. 3. SONET-Ring structure of IEEE 14-Bus system 
 
Fig. 4. DWDM-Ring structure of IEEE 14-Bus system 
D. Step 4: Placement of OADMs and formation of DWDM-
Ring  
EoDWDM [8] is a low-cost high bandwidth technology 
that automates network management for better scalability and 
performance. This technology can automatically detect 
problems across the entire network and resolve them very fast. 
The proposed synthetic network uses this technology for the 
transfer of high-speed PMU data from the substations that 
have PMUs, to the control centers. Note that not all 
substations currently have PMUs. However, considering the 
steady growth in the field of ICT and the popularity of PMUs, 
the proposed design assumes that PMUs will be placed in 
every substation in the near future. Therefore, by default, 
every substation has a high bandwidth EoDWDM channel 
coming out of it and ending in the DWDM-Ring.  
The DWDM-Ring of the proposed design is composed of 
low cost OADMs, each of which is placed near a substation 
having a PMU inside it. An OADM is placed near each of the 
control centers irrespective of whether it contains a PMU or 
not. Similar to the SONET-Ring, the DWDM-Ring is also bi-
directional, ensuring fault tolerance. In case of the IEEE 14-
bus system, an OADM is placed near S2 (main control center), 
S1 (back up control center) and S4, S7, and S11 (PMU 
installed substations). Therefore, a total of five OADMs are 
placed in this system. Fig. 4 shows the DWDM-Ring structure 
of the IEEE 14-bus joint network. 
III. OVERVIEW OF MIIM AND MODELING OF IDRS 
IDRs are logical equations that capture the 
interdependencies between two interacting entities. If they are 
written correctly, then by simply solving the IDRs after an 
entity or a set of entities have failed, the entities that will fail 
next can be identified. In this section, we describe creation of 
IDRs for the smart grid using MIIM. A smart grid system can 
be represented by the set 𝐽(𝐸, 𝐹(𝐸)), where E is the set of 
entities in the joint network belonging to layers 1, 2, and 3 
(𝐸 = 𝑃 ∪ 𝐶 ∪ 𝐶𝑃) and 𝐹(𝐸) is the set of IDRs. In IIM [1], 
which was a precursor to MIIM, only structural dependencies 
were considered to formulate the IDRs. However, MIIM IDRs 
considers both the structural as well as the operational aspects 
of each of the entities during its formulation. In IIM, every 
entity was assigned a value of 0 or 1 depending on whether 
the entity was non-operational or operational. There was no 
concept of reduced operability in IIM, which is a common 
feature of most real systems. The entities in MIIM can take the 
following values: 0 indicating no operation, 1 indicating 
reduced operation, and 2 indicating full operation.   
From an implementation viewpoint, IIM IDRs were 
composed of two standard Boolean operations, namely, AND 
(denoted by ‘.’) and OR (denoted by ‘+’). In contrast, MIIM 
uses three new Boolean operators for formulating the IDRs. 
The first operator is min-AND, denoted by ‘○’, which selects 
the lowest of its input values. The second operator is max-OR, 
denoted by ‘●’, which selects the highest of its input values. 
The third operator is new_XOR, which is denoted by ‘◉’.  If 
all the inputs of new_XOR are same, then the output is also 
the same as the inputs; in all other cases the output is 1. The 
truth table for min-AND, max-OR, and new_XOR are given 
in Table I. 
TABLE I.  TRUTH TABLE FOR PROPOSED NEW OPERATIONS 
Input 1 Input 2 min-AND max-OR new_XOR 
2 2 2 2 2 
2 1 1 2 1 
2 0 0 2 1 
1 2 1 2 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 1 
0 2 0 2 1 
0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 0 0 
We now illustrate the process of creating IDRs using 
MIIM by deriving the IDRs for every entity of the IEEE 14-
bus system. According to the design in Fig. 3, every SADM is 
connected to its neighboring SADMs in the ring. In the MIIM 
IDR of 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 (𝐶2,1,1,0) of the IEEE 14-bus system, this is 
expressed as: 
𝐶2,1,1,0 ← [(𝐶2,1,2,0 ○ 𝐶2,2,1,2 ) ● (𝐶2,1,6,0 ○ 𝐶2,2,1,6)]
≡ 𝐴                                                         (1) 
Here, 𝐶2,1,𝑋,0 denotes 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑋, while 𝐶2,2,1,𝑋 denotes the 
connection between 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 and 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑋, where X is the 
SADM ID. This IDR implies that 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 remains operational 
if either the combination of 𝐶2,1,2,0 AND 𝐶2,2,1,2 is operational 
OR the combination of 𝐶2,1,6,0 AND 𝐶2,2,1,6 is operational. The 
SADMs can also forward the SCADA data collected from 
different substations to the control centers directly. Therefore, 
the MIIM IDR can be modified as:  
𝐶2,1,1,0 ← (𝐴) ● [(𝐶1,2,2,2 ○  𝐶1,4,1,2) ● (𝐶1,2,1,1 ○  𝐶1,4,1,1)] 
                                                                                      ≡ 𝐵     (2)
 
Here, 𝐶1,2,𝑋,𝑋 is the gateway of control center X and 𝐶1,4,1,𝑋 
is the connection between 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 and the gateway of X. Now, 
this 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 also depends on the gateways of substations 2, 6, 
7, 8, 9, and 11 for collecting SCADA data (see Fig. 3). 
Therefore, the IDR is updated as follows: 
𝐶2,1,1,0 ← (𝐵) ○ ((𝐶1,2,2,2 ○ 𝐶1,4,1,2)◉(𝐶1,2,6,6  ○
  𝐶1,4,1,6)◉(𝐶1,2,7,7 ○ 𝐶1,4,1,7)◉(𝐶1,2,8,8 ○ 𝐶1,4,1,8)◉(𝐶1,2,9,9 ○
𝐶1,4,1,9)◉(𝐶1,2,11,11  ○  𝐶1,4,1,11)) ≡ 𝐶                                 (3)  
If all the gateways (2,6,7,8,9,11) from which 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 
receives SCADA data, remain operational then 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 will 
work at its highest level of operation, i.e. 2. If one or more 
gateways fail or the connection between one such gateway and 
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 fails, then 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 will work at a reduced level of 
operation, i.e. 1. If all the gateways connected to the SADM 
fails, then the SADM will also fail as it will have no data to 
carry to the control centers. Lastly, the SADM needs power 
supply to function. Hence, the IDR is further modified as: 
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1(𝐶2,1,1,0) ← (𝐶)  ○  [(𝑃4 ○ 𝐿3,1) ● (𝑃7 ○ 𝐿3,2) ●
 (𝑃9 ○ 𝐿3,3) ● (𝑃5 ○ 𝐿3,4) ● (𝑃6 ○ 𝐿3,5) ● (𝑃12 ○ 𝐿3,6) ●
 (𝑃13 ○ 𝐿3,7) ● (𝑃14 ○ 𝐿3,8) ● (𝑃11 ○ 𝐿3,9) ● (𝑃10 ○
𝐿3,10)]                                                                                         (4)  
The above final IDR of 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 implies that it can receive 
power supply from any of the buses of any of the substations 
it is connected to; 𝑃4, 𝑃7, 𝑃9, 𝑃5, 𝑃6, 𝑃12, 𝑃13, 𝑃14, 𝑃11, 𝑃10 and 
𝐿3,1, 𝐿3,2, 𝐿3,3, 𝐿3,4, 𝐿3,5, 𝐿3,6, 𝐿3,7, 𝐿3,8, 𝐿3,9, 𝐿3,10 are the buses 
and power supply lines respectively to 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1. For the 
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 to work, it should receive power from at least one of 
these buses. In this manner, the IDRs for all the six SADMs in 
the IEEE 14-bus system can be formulated. For creating the 
corresponding IIM IDRs, the ‘○’ and ‘◉’ operators must be 
replaced by ‘.’ and the ‘●’ operator must be replaced by ‘+’. 
Similarly, the IDRs of OADMs can also be formulated for 
both MIIM and IIM.  
Now, the IDR for the gateway of substation 1 can be 
formulated using the following set of steps: 
Step 1: The substation gateway depends on the RTU of 
that substation for receiving SCADA data. This is described 
by,     𝐶1,2,1,1 ← (𝑅1 ○ 𝐶1,6,1,1)  ≡ 𝐷                                    (5) 
where 𝐶1,2,1,1 is the gateway of substation 1, 𝑅1 is the RTU 
of that substation and 𝐶1,6,1,1 is the communication channel 
connecting the RTU to the gateway. If a substation has 
multiple RTUs, then the gateway of that substation collects 
data from all the RTUs of that substation. 
Step 2: The substation gateway should also remain 
connected to at least one of the SADMs. It can receive 
SCADA data from other substations (if the gateway belongs 
to a control center) or it can send SCADA data to the control 
centers through the SONET-Ring. Also, if the gateway is 
connected to an SADM but the RTU of the substation does not 
work, then the gateway will not be able to send any data to the 
SADM. Finally, if one (or more in the case of control centers) 
SADM(s) connected to the gateway fail then the gateway will 
work at a reduced level of operation. This is described by the 
following IDR: 
𝐶1,2,1,1 ← [(𝐷) ○ ((𝐶2,1,1,0 ○ 𝐶1,4,1,1)◉(𝐶2,1,2,0 ○
𝐶1,4,2,1)◉(𝐶2,1,3,0 ○ 𝐶1,4,3,1)◉(𝐶2,1,4,0 ○ 𝐶1,4,4,1)◉(𝐶2,1,5,0 ○
𝐶1,4,5,1)◉(𝐶2,1,6,0 ○ 𝐶1,4,6,1))]   ≡ 𝐸                                    (6)  
In this IDR, 𝐶2,1,𝑋,0  is 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑋 and 𝐶1,4,𝑋,𝑌 are the ethernet 
connections between 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑋 and 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑌. 
Step 3: The substation gateway is also dependent on the 
PMU of that substation for receiving PMU data, i.e. 
                      𝐶1,2,1,1 ← (𝑈2 ○ 𝐶1,7,2,1)  ≡ 𝐹                    (7)  
In this IDR, 𝑈2 is the PMU of that substation and 𝐶1,7,2,1 is 
the communication channel connecting the PMU to the 
gateway. Similar to the case of RTUs, if a substation has 
multiple PMUs, then the gateway of that substation collects 
data from all the PMUs of that substation. 
Step 4: The gateway should also remain connected to at 
least one OADM (similar to Step 2 in the case of SADMs). 
Hence, 
𝐶1,2,1,1 ← [(𝐹) ○ ((𝐶3,1,1,0 ○ 𝐶1,5,1,1)◉(𝐶3,1,2,0 ○
𝐶1,5,2,1)◉(𝐶3,1,3,0 ○ 𝐶1,5,3,1)◉(𝐶3,1,4,0 ○ 𝐶1,5,4,1)◉(𝐶3,1,5,0 ○
𝐶1,5,5,1)◉(𝐶3,1,6,0 ○ 𝐶1,5,6,1))]  ≡ 𝐺                                    (8)  
In the above IDR, 𝐶3,1,𝑋,0 is 𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑋  and 𝐶1,5,𝑋,𝑌 implies 
the DWDM connections between 𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑀𝑋 and 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦𝑌. 
Step 5: The gateway should receive power from at least 
one of the buses in that substation. 
Step 6: The gateway should remain connected to the 
substation server. 
In order to obtain SCADA data from the buses of a 
substation, Steps 1, 2, 5, and 6 should be followed. Thus, the 
following IDR can be used to determine if a gateway is 
operational with respect to SCADA data. In other words, if the 
evaluation of the following IDR results in 2 (highest 
operational level) or 1 (reduced operational level), then the 
SCADA data from the corresponding buses can be received 
by the server of the substation. 
𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦1
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐴(𝐶1,2,1,1) ← [𝐶1,1,1,1 ○ 𝐶1,3,1,1] ○ [𝐸] ○
 [(𝑃4  ○ 𝐿2,4) ● (𝑃7  ○ 𝐿2,7) ● (𝑃9  ○ 𝐿2,9) ● (𝑃𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡1  ○
𝐿6,1)]                                                                                        (9)  
The above IDR is the final 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦1
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐴(𝐶1,2,1,1) IDR 
for Case 1 where strictly separate channels are used for RTU 
and PMU data. However, for Case 2, if all the connections to 
the SADMs fail, the gateway can still receive SCADA data 
from the other substations if the data is sent through the high 
bandwidth EoDWDM network, i.e. through the OADMs. 
Therefore, the above IDR can be further modified for Case 2 
as shown below:  
𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦1
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐴(𝐶1,2,1,1) ← [𝐶1,1,1,1 ○ 𝐶1,3,1,1] ○ [(𝐷) ○
(((𝐶2,1,1,0 ○ 𝐶1,4,1,1)◉(𝐶2,1,2,0 ○ 𝐶1,4,2,1)◉(𝐶2,1,3,0 ○
𝐶1,4,3,1)◉(𝐶2,1,4,0 ○ 𝐶1,4,4,1)◉(𝐶2,1,5,0 ○ 𝐶1,4,5,1)◉(𝐶2,1,6,0 ○
𝐶1,4,6,1))●((𝐶3,1,1,0 ○ 𝐶1,5,1,1)◉(𝐶3,1,2,0 ○
𝐶1,5,2,1)◉(𝐶3,1,3,0 ○ 𝐶1,5,3,1)◉(𝐶3,1,4,0 ○ 𝐶1,5,4,1)◉(𝐶3,1,5,0 ○
𝐶1,5,5,1)◉(𝐶3,1,6,0 ○ 𝐶1,5,6,1)))] ○  [(𝑃4  ○ 𝐿2,4) ● (𝑃7  ○
𝐿2,7) ● (𝑃9  ○ 𝐿2,9) ● (𝑃𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡1  ○ 𝐿6,1)]                        (10)  
In order to obtain PMU data from the buses of a substation, 
Steps 3, 4, 5, and 6 should be followed. The following IDR 
can be used to determine if a gateway is operational with 
respect to PMU data. In other words, if the evaluation of the 
following IDR results in 2 (highest operational level) or 1 
(reduced operational level), then the PMU data from the 
corresponding buses can be received by the server of the 
substation. 
𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦1
𝑃𝑀𝑈(𝐶1,2,1,1) ← [𝐶1,1,1,1 ○ 𝐶1,3,1,1] ○ [𝐺] ○
[(𝑃4  ○ 𝐿2,4) ● (𝑃7  ○ 𝐿2,7) ● (𝑃9  ○ 𝐿2,9) ● (𝑃𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡1  ○
𝐿6,1)]                                                                                         (11)  
Now, gateway 1 is said to be fully operational if the 
following IDR gives a value 2, which implies that both 
SCADA and PMU data is sent (or received in case of control 
centers) by the gateway. If the IDR gives a value of 1, then it 
can be stated that either the PMU data or the SCADA data is 
sent/received by the gateway. If none of the two types of data 
is sent or received, then the evaluation of the following IDR 
will give 0. 
    𝐶1,2,1,1 ⟵ 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦1
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐷𝐴  ◉ 𝐺𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑦1
𝑃𝑀𝑈             (12) 
A substation server depends on the substation gateway and 
the power supply links from at least one of the buses of the 
substation. Therefore, the IDR of the server of substation 1 of 
IEEE 14-bus system can be written as: 
𝐶1,1,1,1 ← (𝐶1,2,1,1  ○  𝐶1,3,1,1)  ○  [(𝑃4  ○ 𝐿1,4) ● (𝑃7  ○
𝐿1,7) ● (𝑃9  ○ 𝐿1,9) ● (𝑃𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡1  ○ 𝐿5,1)]                          (13)  
In the above IDR, 𝐿1,4, 𝐿1,7, 𝐿1,9 are the power supply lines 
to the server from buses 𝑃4, 𝑃7, 𝑃9, respectively. 𝐿5,1 is the 
power supply line to the gateway from the battery backup 
𝑃𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡1. Following these steps, the IDRs of the substation 
servers and substation gateways for every substation can be 
derived for a synthetic joint network of a power system. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
The IEEE 14-bus network is used to illustrate the 
cascading failures that take place after a single failure occurs 
in the joint network. The failure which is simulated is a 
terrorist attack on substation 6 of this system. The physical 
attack leads to the immediate failure of Bus 12 (𝑃12), 
substation server (𝐶1,1,6,6), and substation gateway (𝐶1,2,6,6). 
The division of buses into substations for the IEEE 14-bus 
system is shown in Fig. 2 The operational statuses of the 
communication entities which transfer the data to the control 
center are calculated using MIIM IDRs and IIM IDRs, 
respectively. Table II shows how the smart grid system is 
affected gradually at each time step, denoted by 𝑇𝑖, if MIIM 
IDRs are employed. From Table II, it is observed that as a 
result of substation 6 failure, bus 𝑃12, gateway and server 
inside substation 6 fails immediately (at time instant T1). 
Consequently, the SONEToE and EoDWDM channels 
coming out of gateway 6 fail at the next time instant (T2). At 
T3, 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 and 𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑀1 start working at a reduced level of 
operation as they are not getting the expected data from 
gateway 6, but still get data from the other gateways to which 
they are connected. The cascading failure of entities stops at 
T3. The results obtained using MIIM IDRs are same 
irrespective of whether data transmission is done on the basis 
of Case 1 or Case 2. 
TABLE II.  FAILURE OF ENTITIES WITH TIME OBTAINED USING MIIM 
T1 𝑃12
→ 0 
𝐶1,1,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,2,6,6
→ 0 
    
T2 𝑃12
→ 0 
𝐶1,1,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,2,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,4,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,5,1,6
→ 0 
  
T3 𝑃12
→ 0 
𝐶1,1,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,2,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,4,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,5,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶2,1,1,0
→ 𝟏 
𝐶3,1,1,0
→ 𝟏 
 
When IIM IDRs are used, two different results are 
obtained for the two cases of data transmission. Table III 
shows the cascading failure of entities obtained using IIM 
IDRs. The failure of entities at time instants T1 and T2 happen 
in the same way as in the case of MIIM. At T3,  𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑀1 and 
𝑂𝐴𝐷𝑀1 fail completely due to the failure of one of the 
gateways (gateway 6) connected to them. This happens due to 
the binary nature of IIM, which does not account for reduced 
operability. Consequently, at time instant T4, no SCADA data 
is obtained from 𝑃10, 𝑃11, 𝑃13, and 𝑃14 for Case 1, and  𝑃11 and 
𝑃14 for Case 2. More entities fail in Case 1 than in Case 2 
because in Case 2, unlike Case 1, the high bandwidth channel 
is capable of carrying both RTU and PMU data (see Section 
II.A).  
TABLE III.  FAILURE OF ENTITIES WITH TIME OBTAINED USING IIM 
T1 
𝑃12
→ 0 
𝐶1,1,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,2,6,6
→ 0 
     
T2 
𝑃12
→ 0 
𝐶1,1,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,2,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,4,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,5,1,6
→ 0 
   
T3 
𝑃12
→ 0 
𝐶1,1,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,2,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,4,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,5,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶2,1,1,0
→ 𝟎 
𝐶3,1,1,0
→ 𝟎 
 
T4 
CA
SE 
1 
𝑃12 
→ 0 
𝐶1,1,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,2,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,4,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,5,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶2,1,1,0
→ 𝟎 
𝐶3,1,1,0
→ 𝟎 
NO  
SCA-
DA 
FROM 
𝑃10 , 𝑃11, 
𝑃13 ,𝑃14  
 
T4 
CA
SE 
2 
𝑃12 
→ 0 
𝐶1,1,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,2,6,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,4,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶1,5,1,6
→ 0 
𝐶2,1,1,0
→ 𝟎 
𝐶3,1,1,0
→ 𝟎 
NO  
SCA-
DA 
FROM 
𝑃11 , 𝑃14  
V. STATE ESTIMATION RESULTS  
State estimation is performed for the IEEE 118-bus system 
to (1) understand if MIIM can predict the system state more 
accurately than IIM, and (2) demonstrate the scalability of 
MIIM. The state estimation is performed considering a single 
entity or multiple entity failures and the states predicted using 
MIIM and IIM are both compared for the two different cases 
of communication discussed earlier.  
A. Overview of state estimation 
The voltage magnitudes and angles (or the real and 
imaginary components of voltages) of all the buses constitute 
the states of the system. They are estimated using the 
formulated IDRs and the measurements obtained from the 
RTUs and PMUs. Note that loss of measurements from the 
sensors of a bus can result in a bad estimate of the state of that 
bus and/or the states of the neighboring buses. The 
relationship between the state matrix V and the measurement 
matrix 𝑍 for a bus that has a PMU placed on it, is given by: 
                𝑍 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑍𝑟
𝑆
𝑍𝑖
𝑆
𝑍𝑟
𝑃
𝑍𝑖
𝑃
𝐼𝑟
𝐼𝑖 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 =   
[
 
 
 
 
 
1 0
0 1
1 0
0 1
𝐶1 𝐶2
𝐶3 𝐶4]
 
 
 
 
 
  [
𝑉𝑟
𝑉𝑖
]  ≡ 𝐽𝑉           (14)  
where 𝑍𝑟
𝑆, 𝑍𝑖
𝑆 denote the real and imaginary voltages 
estimated using the traditional SCADA-based state estimation 
[11], 𝑍𝑟
𝑃 , 𝑍𝑖
𝑃 denote the real and imaginary voltage 
measurements obtained from the PMU, and 𝐼𝑟 , 𝐼𝑖   denote the 
real and imaginary (branch) current measurements obtained 
from the PMU. The matrices 𝐶1, 𝐶2, 𝐶3, 𝐶4 which relate the 
(branch) current measurements to the states of the system are 
obtained from the admittance matrix of the system. For 
instance, if a branch ‘ab’ with a series impedance 𝑔𝑎𝑏 + 𝑗 𝑏𝑎𝑏  
and shunt admittance  𝑔𝑎0 + 𝑗 𝑏𝑎0 has a current 𝐼𝑎𝑏 flowing 
through it, then the relationship between the current in 
rectangular coordinates and the states of the system are given 
by: 
[
(𝐼𝑎𝑏)𝑟
(𝐼𝑎𝑏)𝑖
]
=  [
𝑔𝑎𝑏 −𝑔𝑎𝑏
(𝑏𝑎𝑏 + 𝑏𝑎0) −𝑏𝑎𝑏
      
(−𝑏𝑎𝑏 − 𝑏𝑎0) 𝑏𝑎𝑏
𝑔𝑎𝑏 −𝑔𝑎𝑏 
] [
(𝑉𝑎)𝑟
(𝑉𝑎)𝑖
(𝑉𝑏)𝑟
(𝑉𝑏)𝑖
] 
                                                                                                      (15) 
The matrix 𝐽 represents the matrix relating the 
measurements and the states of the system. 𝑉𝑟 , 𝑉𝑖 denotes the 
real and imaginary estimates of the states. In (15), the relation 
between the measurements and the states is linear, which 
means that it can be solved using the weighted least squares 
approach: 
                        𝑉 =  (𝐽𝑇𝑊−1𝐽)−1 ((𝐽𝑇𝑊−1) 𝑍                   (16) 
In (16), the matrix 𝑊 is the final weight matrix comprising 
error covariance matrices of both SCADA and PMU 
measurements in rectangular form. The matrix 𝑊 is obtained 
using the methodology developed in [12]. In this paper, the 
SCADA measurement errors are assumed to be from a 
Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and 3% standard deviation, 
while the errors in the PMU measurements are assumed to be 
from a Gaussian distribution with 0 mean and 0.1% standard 
deviation. 
B. Hardware failure of gateway 13 and SADM 39 of IEEE 
118-bus system  
The gateway 13 is connected to bus 13 and SADM 39 is 
placed at substation 76 containing bus 85. Failure of gateway 
13 results in loss of SCADA measurements at bus 14 for 
MIIM. The same original event results in the loss of SCADA 
measurements at buses 12, 13, 14, and 16, and loss of PMU 
measurements at bus 12 for IIM. The above-mentioned 
failures are common to both Case 1 and Case 2. Subsequent 
case-specific results are described below. 
Case 1: As the high bandwidth channel cannot be used for 
carrying both RTU data and PMU data in this case, it results 
in an additional loss of SCADA measurements at buses 84, 
85, and 88 for both MIIM and IIM, and a loss of PMU 
measurement at bus 85 for IIM due to SADM 39 failure. The 
state estimation results are shown in Fig. 5, which depicts the 
absolute difference between the estimated value and the true 
value of the states for both the interdependency models. The 
buses 7, 12, 84, 85, 88, and 117 observe a significant 
difference between the estimated states for both the models. 
This is because, the buses 84 and 88 (7 and 117) are neighbors 
of bus 85 (12) which loses PMU data in the case of IIM, but 
not in the case of MIIM.  
Case 2: In this case, the high bandwidth channel is 
capable of carrying both RTU and PMU data. Because of this, 
no subsequent failures take place for both IIM and MIIM. The 
results obtained on performing state estimation are shown in 
Fig. 6. The difference between the estimated states for both 
the models is considerable at buses 7, 12, and 117, due to the 
same reason mentioned in Case 1.  
Fig. 5. State estimation result for gateway 13 and SADM 39 failure for 
Case 1 
Fig. 6. State estimation result for gateway 13 and SADM 39 failure for 
Case 2 
C. Damage of substation 85 of IEEE 118-bus system  
Substation 85 consists of bus 95 of the IEEE 118-bus 
system. Damage to this substation would result in loss of all 
communication entities placed at or connected to substation 
85. This results in PMU measurement losses at bus 94 and 
SCADA measurement losses at bus 94, 95, and 100 for IIM. 
However, it results in measurement loss at only bus 95 for 
MIIM. The above-mentioned failures are common to both 
Case 1 and Case 2. Subsequent case-specific results are 
described below. 
Fig. 7. State estimation result for substation 85 failure for Case 1 
Case 2: In this case, since the high bandwidth channel is 
capable of carrying both RTU and PMU data, no subsequent 
failures take place for both IIM and MIIM. The results 
obtained on performing state estimation are shown in Fig. 8.  
The buses 93, 94, 95, and 100 observe a notable difference 
between the estimated states for both the models for the same 
reason mentioned in the previous case. 
Fig. 8. State estimation result for substation 85 failure for Case 2 
The results obtained above confirm that the states of the 
system estimated using MIIM are closer to the true values than 
the ones obtained using IIM. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
An accurate estimation of the system’s operating status in 
case of a failure, even before the failure occurs or even while 
that failure is manifesting, is extremely important and 
valuable. However, doing this for the modern smart grid is 
difficult because the intra-and-inter-dependencies between its 
power-and-communication networks are not well understood. 
The model presented in this paper, namely MIIM, is an effort 
by us to correctly capture these dependencies. The power 
system application that is used to demonstrate the practical 
utility of MIIM is state estimation. The results indicate that 
MIIM, in comparison to its predecessor, IIM, is more realistic 
in estimating the system state after some failure has occurred 
in the joint power-communication network. The future scope 
of work includes the use of MIIM for examining more 
complicated power/communication failure scenarios, such as 
EMP attacks, as well as for analyzing progressive recovery 
options of the joint network following a blackout/brownout. 
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